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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) operates 
Lakes Lanier and Allatoona, two large multipurpose 
reservoirs in the metropolitan Atlanta area. Releases from 
these dams regulate the greatest share of draws to meet 
municipal and industrial uses in the region. These dams 
also produce hydroelectric power, provide flood control, and 
elevate lake levels to enable recreational use by visitors 
from within and outside the region, as well as by nearby 
residents. 
The Lanier and Allatoona reservoirs were originally 
designed primarily for power and flood control, albeit with 
significant attention leveled to municipal and instream flow 
water uses. Because these dams were developed to provide 
maximum National Economic Development (NED) 
benefits, there have historically been no charges assessed to 
any other use except hydropower. With the advent of cost-
sharing in the 1980s, new additional uses of storage that 
reduced hydropower benefits were expected to reimburse 
the federal treasury for benefits foregone, either directly or 
by purchasing the equivalent amount of storage reallocated 
from hydropower_ to the new uses. The separable and joint-
use costs of storage allocated to hydropower have 
historically been recaptured through charges to the power 
customers. Joint-use costs are average costs of facilities 
serving multiple uses, assessed in proportion to the benefits 
remaining after separable costs. 
The concern of this paper is twofold: First, the cost-
sharing rules that allocate expenses in the initial formulation 
of a project often fail to remain equitable once demands for 
water and storage change. Second, where demands have 
changed, reallocating storage behind the dam along lines 
traditionally followed by the Corps may fail to capture the 
true costs and benefits of resources currently allocated to 
marginal uses in comparison to storage that, if reallocated, 
might better serve the new uses. One such example may be 
storage currently allocated to hydropower-of diminishing 
utility in a deregulated market with abundant and 
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inexpensive thermal substitutes-which might be far more 
valuable when reallocated to uses for which no good 
substitutes are available, such as municipal water supply. 
This paper explores institutional impediments to storage 
reallocation in multipurpose federal reservoirs to achieve 
their highest and best uses. 
In initial dam design, the Corps details a list of the 
benefits of multiple-use coordination. The size of the 
project is allowed to expand as long as adding another use 
continues to make it cheaper for evecyone involved to 
participate. Known as 'subadditive costs' or 'returns to 
scale,' project size is determined so that it would be more 
expensive for any individual use to go-it-alone to meet its 
. needs than for all to collectively participate in a multiple-
use project. This principle guides the Corps in establishing 
project size as well as recovering the costs of construction, 
operation, and maintenance. The Corps' objective in 
establishing 'fair' charges for access to these services is to 
assure that evecy use benefits from participation above any 
independent, go-it-alone strategy. 
The fairness objective is relatively easy to assure if the 
size of the project is chosen such that it initially conforms 
to a cost-efficient scale. In time, however, uses of storage 
may shift from those originally contemplated, in which case 
competitive pressures are exerted to convert storage 
historically used to supply original demands that have 
become less valuable to new demands that are becoming 
more valuable. It is just this sort evolution of demands that 
has launched the current Georgia, Alabama and Florida 
water conflict - ostensibly over the reallocation of storage 
in federal reservoirs in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint (ACF) and Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River 
Basins. The use and potential reallocation of storage in 
Lakes Lanier and Allatoona lies at the heart of this conflict. 
Separable Costs - Remaining Benefits 
To understand the foundation of the reallocation issue, 
it is necessacy to introduce the basic cost allocation 
principles guiding the Corps in financing multipurpose 
reservorrs. The most widely used cost allocation 
mechanism is the Separable Costs - Remaining Benefits 
(SCRB) method [Inter-Agency Committee on Water 
Resources, 1950]. By this method, each user of storage is 
assessed charges according to the following general rule. 
So called 'separable costs' are assessed first. These charges 
reflect the increase in overall project cost attributable to 
adding a particular use or purpose to the project. Some 
purposes may drive the costs up appreciably while others 
might require more modest increases, but in no case can the 
separable costs exceed the benefits supplied by the use -
else that purpose would not be included in the project 
because it would increase rather than reduce the costs to the 
other participants. Thereafter, so-called joint-use or non-
separable costs - costs for facilities serving multiple uses 
and/or required to meet remaining project costs - are 
distributed in proportion to the benefits remaining each 
purpose after its separable costs have been deducted. While 
a number of mechanisms exist for sharing joint-use costs 
[Driessen and Tijs, 1985], if project size is chosen to 
maximize the benefits from multiple-use coordination, the 
SCRB cost allocation method supplies net benefits to each 
purpose above any go-it-alone strategy. Simply stated, 
SCRB ensures that all purposes share equitably in the 
benefits of multipurpose development, . the implied 
assumption being that large multipurpose dams are more 
cost-effective than several smaller dams serving fewer or 
even single purposes. 
The cost allocation and recovery rules serve an 
important social and economic function - that of securing 
commitment from every user of storage. Whenever 
participants pay their share of the capital needed to sustain 
project services, they perceive themselves to be 
enfranchised into the operation. The project is effectively 
'purchased' by the users, thus freeing the Corps to re-invest 
these contributions into new projects. The national 
electrification program testifies to the success of leveraging 
initial resources and of involving local assurers in this way. 
It is important to note that the Corps' objective is not 
cost recovery, but in maximizing National Economic 
Development (NED) economic benefits supplied by the 
project; this fundamental principle is most often overlooked 
by those users of storage in federal reservoirs required to 
reimburse their separable and joint-use costs, and who then 
feel entitled in perpetuity to storage allocated to their 
particular use. The unavoidable fact remains, however, that 
federal reservoirs are public works, owned by the public at 
large. As an example, for many of the older Corps projects 
constructed before non-federal cost-sharing became 
widespread - including Lanier and Allatoona - the only 
costs recovered have been the separable and joint-use 
hydropower costs, these through contracts with federal 
power marketing agencies distinct from the Corps. Federal 
hydropower has been sold rather than freely distributed as 
are recreation, flood control, minimum instream flows and 
navigation benefits, because hydropower benefits have 
traditionally reduced the capital and operating costs of 
individual private power producers, whereas the non-power 
amenities have typically been regarded as benefitting the 
public at large. The controversy arises when an emerging 
new use - municipal water supply, for example- seeks to 
use storage previously reserved for hydropower. Because 
considerable repayment of costs may have already been 
made by the power customers over the years, they consider 
themselves to be the rightful owners of storage in the 
federal projects, having lost sight of the fact they are in 
reality merely private beneficiaries of publicly-owned 
storage, who have been asked to repay only the costs of 
constructing and operating the storage supplying the benefit 
stream. This misperception exacerbates the competition 
between users of storage and greatly impedes the 
conversion ofhydropower storage to more efficient public 
use, whether there is a surplus of storage allocated to power 
or whether sufficient benefits can no longer be generated 
justifying (under SCRB) the continued commitment of 
publicly-owned storage to the hydropower purpose. 
Through the SCRB cost-allocation process the Corps 
shifts, in a meaningful sense, from a project owner to a 
project manager and regulator. There is a compelling prima 
facie case that the fixed cost recovery rules of SCRB outline 
an ethically fair and socially responsible mechanism to 
deliver services and share costs of large-scale water 
resource development. The cost allocation rules themselves 
reveal the traditional objectives and Congressional mandate 
of the Corps. When the assessment structure recaptures up-
front investment costs, the Corps can be viewed as a facility 
builder for sale rather than as a service provider for hire. In 
its mission to on-going service, the Corps is responsible to 
oversee provision of the original project intent. In this role, 
the Corps serves an on-going function in adjudicating the 
rules for allocating and re-allocating access to the services 
derived from its projects. Once re-allocations stray too far 
from the original project design or from pre-authorized re-
allocation limits, the Corps must consult Congress directly, 
presumably as a check to assure that changes in service 
allocations and assessments are still fair. As one example, 
the Corps has effected minor reallocations of storage in 
Lake Allatoona to supply municipal water needs that have 
not required Congressional action. On the other hand, an 
appeal to Congress to reallocate a substantial portion of 
conservation storage in Lake Lanier from hydropower to 
municipal water supply is the instrument that provoked the 
current water-use conflict. 
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With respect to the stated concerns of this paper, the 
issue is whether the rules applied in the above-mentioned 
administrative and Congressional reallocations do in fact 
ensure economic efficiency as well as the equitable sharing 
of benefits of multipurpose development. 
The highest and best uses water and storage in 
Northern Georgia have shifted. It is not unreasonable to 
wonder if the original Lanier project, launched today, would 
have to be re-designed to accommodate current demands. 
It is likely, ifthe opportunity cost of foregone water supply 
storage were taken into account, that power would not 
produce benefits in excess of its separable costs and so 
would not have been included as a project purpose. Yet a 
facility already exists, is being regulated, and charges for 
power generated are being assessed. This introduces a 
complication. As reallocations are made, the cost 
assessments have to be amended to assure that each new use 
added still realizes a positive net benefit from the dam 
above its 'go-it-alone' options. However, the marginal 
yield of storage for each new added use approaches zero as 
the accumulated demands approach the average streamflow, 
so that the last user appears to require a much larger block 
of storage per unit of demand than the first. As a 
consequence of simply applying SCRB to the next 
increment of storage required by the new use, the costs of 
reallocation are typically determined to be the costs of 
additional storage required rather than the benefits foregone 
by converting the existing use(s) to another. The 
paradoxical consequence of diminishing yield of storage is 
that the last added user must pay more to be included in a 
large multipurpose reservoir than to build a separate smaller 
reservoir dedicated to his use alone, a contradiction to the 
fundamental premise of SCRB - that multipurpose 
development is more cost-effective than single-purpose 
development. 
Though several reallocation mechanisms exist, as 
discussed below, the prevailing practice requires any added 
municipal water user to pay the share of replacement costs 
of storage to cover the fixed costs needed to rebuild the 
original dam corresponding to that storage allocation. This 
can create a distortion. The capitalization rules established 
to recover costs under one project design for Lake Lanier 
and Lake Allatoona might not satisfy the net beneficial cost 
allocation criteria for today's distribution of services from 
those same structures. Specifically, the growing shift in 
resource allocation away from hydroelectric power to 
municipal water and other instream flow demands may 
require a different pricing scheme than has been assumed. 
Storage Allocation and Cost Recovery 
It is important to recognize that the Corps does not sell 
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instream flow rights to users of its reservoirs. Instead, the 
Corps typically manages new demands by reallocating 
storage capacity behind the dams from the existing to the 
new uses. This is consistent with its federally-mandated 
role as builder and regulator as opposed to fee-for-service 
contractor. By assessing charges to recover either storage 
replacement costs or benefits foregone (whichever is 
greater), the intent of reallocation is to legitimately 
enfranchise the new users and re-enfranchise the public at 
large by making the new beneficiaries compensate the 
federal .treasury for the losses (benefits and/or storage) 
visited upon the original users. 
This all seems fair - if a new use is economical, it 
should pay its own way against the use it replaces. Yet this 
provision embodies certain critical assumptions. Under the 
Corps' Principles and Guidelines, there are four measures 
of cost of reallocated storage, the highest of which 
determines the costs to be levied against the new use. These 
are briefly described as follows: 
(I) Go-it-alone replacement cost for the existing uses 
displaced by the new use (replacement cost) 
(2) Economic value of benefits foregone by the existing 
uses due to the new use (benefits foregone) 
(3) Foregone revenues from existing users due to the new 
use (revenues foregone) 
( 4) Updated replacement cost of storage needed to 
accommodate the new use (updated replacement cost 
of storage) 
In the case of hydropower, replacement cost equals 
(and is in fact identical to) benefits foregone, i.e., the 
benefits foregone by storage being reallocated from 
hydropower in a federal reservoir to another purpose are the 
costs of replacing the power in the private system. 
Revenues foregone are the value of the federal power 
marketing contracts unfulfilled as a result of the new use, 
but, since benefits must exceed the separable and joint-use 
costs of storage assigned to the hydropower purpose, 
benefits foregone should always exceed revenues foregone. 
Likewise, unless storage replacement costs have escalated 
more rapidly than the benefits provided by storage, benefits 
foregone should control as well. Thus in all cases if the 
project has been properly formulated initially and the 
economic benefits of the original uses have not changed 
significantly over time, benefits foregone should always 
predominate. If not, a strong indication is provided that the 
highest and best uses of storage are not being provided and 
a reallocation is needed. 
In contrast, however, the reallocation processes at 
Lakes Allatoona and Lanier have resulted in the fourth 
provision {updated storage replacement cost) being 
consistently reported by the Corps to be the highest cost 
calibrated to accommodate increased demand for municipal 
and industrial water supply. 
One explanation for this inconsistency may lie in the 
diminishing yield of storage previously described, wherein 
the last user draws the reservoir down further per unit 
withdrawal than the first, principally because the marginal 
impact of the last user includes the accumulated impacts of 
all existing users as well. Yet the fundamental premise of 
SCRB is that the average unit cost of service provision 
(building the dam) decrease as the dam is built higher and 
the reservoir made deeper, i.e. costs are subadditive. So the 
last incremental increase should cost less than the previous 
uses if the project is made larger, i.e., total storage is 
increased. If not, SCRB dictates that the last incremental 
increase should at least not exceed the cost of a new 
reservoir serving only the new use. As we go the other 
direction, therefore, pricing smaller facilities serving fewer 
purposes, each block of conservation storage required to 
serve the new uses will be more expensive. 
In cases where updated replacement costs actually do 
exceed benefits foregone, the previous explanation does not 
suffice, but it may then be suggested that the original 
project purposes are no longer viable, i.e., no longer sustain 
project replacement costs. The economic value of the 
benefits foregone of a block of conservation storage 
presumably justified building the dam originally at least to 
that storage scale. Simply, the reason a dam is built is 
because the estimated economic value of the benefits from 
the dam exceed the costs. So at least the sum of storage 
replacement costs should be smaller than the sum total of 
economic benefits provided by that amount of storage. This 
means that benefits foregone should exceed the costs of 
replacement if the original project purposes still rationalize 
rebuilding the project. If not, in the case of hydropower, 
this means that replacement power resources are relatively 
less expensive, and hydropower is less critical to the 
aggregate benefits produced by the project. Concurrently, 
as growth pressures place greater demands on municipal 
water supplies, asking the new uses to justify the updated 
cost of storage replacement when current uses do not 
generate sufficient benefits to cover this same cost indicates 
that the highest and best uses of the existing dam are not 
occurring. In this case, assessments levied against the new 
uses are likely to exceed the costs of independent go-it-
alone options, threatening the primary fairness objectives of 
SCRB pricing that enfranchise users into federal water 
projects. 
With respect to updated replacement cost of storage, 
it can be further argued that only the operating costs rather. 
than the fixed costs of storage need be reimbursed by new 
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users. In the language of economics, once the benefits of an 
existing facility change and no longer cover the fixed 
investment replacement costs, but continue to cover the 
operating or marginal costs, the facility should remain in 
operation. Although it would not be rebuilt, the facility's 
fixed expenses are already committed, or sunk. At this 
point, pricing strategies can no longer function as average 
cost pricing rules - it is only the operation costs that need 
to be recovered. Assessing fees intended to recover the 
sunk costs under such circumstances would overcharge for 
the services provided. Whether or not sunk costs are 
assessed, however, it is clear that the highest and best use of 
a facility is assured, even when the uses change, only when 
new allocations cover the economic value of services 
displaced rather than the updated costs of storage 
replacement. 
The previous discussion presents a strong case for 
concluding that conservation storage reallocation, with 
updated costs of storage being assessed to the new users, is 
not an appropriate mechanism to assure that public funds 
are put to their the highest and best use. If the highest 
competing use of storage causes a reduction in benefits to 
the existing uses, economic efficiency dictates that the value 
of the foregone benefits should be assessed directly against 
the new user. Furthermore, marginal cost pricing should 
prevail over average cost pricing to prevent sunk costs from 
infecting the allocation process, and to ensure that the 
highest of the four costs will always be benefits foregone. 
Reality Check 
In the final analysis, it is worthwhile to question 
whether calculated storage requirements for new uses and 
pricing irregularities make much of a difference in the 
outcome of the storage reallocation process. After all, if the 
process is only a little inefficient or unfairly biased toward 
the existing uses of storage, the outcome may not differ 
materially from the outcome of the "correct" process. 
Operational simulations performed using both the 
ACT/ACF Comprehensive Study STELLA and HEC-5 
models [McMahon 1998] show that the storage 
requirements attributed to the last added use to be 
substantially overstated, to such a degree that it is likely that 
the Corps did not need to seek Congressional reallocation of 
storage in Lake Lanier to meet the metropolitan Atlanta-
area' s increased municipal water needs well into the next 
century. The situation is the same at Lake Allatoona, where 
municipal demands can· easily be met for the foreseeable 
future without need of further reallocation of storage. 
Replacement costs of storage being assessed to the 
new users under the SCRB cost allocation rule provides a 
clear indication that more storage is being allocated to the 
new users than necessary, and that the highest and best uses 
of reallocated storage are not being attained. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The issues raised in the foregoing discussion are 
briefly listed and summarized as follows: 
( 1) Because the values of the various uses of storage 
change, the original storage allocations may fail to remain 
equitable over the lifetimes of federal multipurpose 
reservoirs. A social welfare loss occurs as a consequence of 
publicly-owned water resource development not being put 
to its highest and best use. 
(2) Diminishing yield of storage under the accumulated 
burdens of existing and new additional uses of storage 
obscures the determination of the amount of storage needing 
to be allocated to the new uses and/or reallocated from the 
existing to the new uses. The misapplication of SCRB 
procedures in reallocation studies performed by the Corps 
typically overstates the storage requirement, resulting in 
storage replacement costs exceeding benefits foregone - a 
conclusion that favors existing, less efficient uses over 
emerging new, more valuable uses. Where storage 
requirement for a new use has been correctly calculated, it 
should always be less than the storage required in a single-
purpose reservoir serving that use. 
(3) In reallocating storage in existing federal reservoirs, 
the governing criterion of the four cost accounts of 
Principles and Guidelines should always revert to benefits 
foregone, based on the SCRB rationale that all project 
purposes should produce benefits in excess of their 
separable costs. Correctly-determined storage costs 
exceeding benefits foregone clearly indicates the need for 
reallocation, and in order not to impede reallocation to the 
highest and best use, sunk costs should not infect the 
storage pricing process. 
(4) The errors made by the Corps in calculating the 
storage requirements for municipal water supply from 
Lakes Lanier and Allatoona have in the past been 
substantial. In the case of Allatoona, it is likely that 
municipalities have already been allocated sufficient storage 
to meet 2050 demands, so that no additional reallocation is 
necessary. In the case of Lanier, it is very possible that the 
Corps' reallocation request triggering the three-State water 
conflict was unnecessary, or at least premature, and that the 
Atlanta-region's increased water demands could have been 
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